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Instructing Illinois Juries on the Definition of
"Reasonable Doubt": The Need for Reform
Timothy P. O'Neilr
It is difficult to find a plainer or more explicit definition of
reasonable doubt than the words themselves, and efforts to do so
usually result merely in an elaboration of language without any
corresponding amplification of the idea.'
I find it rather unsettling that we are using a formulation that we
believe will become less clear the more we explain it.
2
I. INTRODUCTION
The jury empaneled to decide whether Terry Williams aided and
abetted the man who killed Ricky Lee Moore faced a difficult task.'
Ricky Lee Moore was shot in the head while he was talking to a friend
on a pay phone.4 At trial, the state presented witnesses who testified
that a man fitting Terry Williams's general description was seen run-
ning from the murder scene.' Another witness, Dion Lowe, testified
that Terry Williams was the "right hand man" to the leader of a large
Chicago street gang.6 Lowe further testified that Williams approached
Robert Hawkins, a fellow gang member, gave him a gun, and told him
to kill Moore. When Robert Hawkins was arrested, he told the
authorities that Terry Williams told him that the leader of their gang
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; A.B., Harvard University
(1972); J.D., University of Michigan (1975). The author wishes to acknowledge the
invaluable research assistance of Sandra Nelson and Eric Scheiner.
I. People v. Leggio, 161 N.E. 60, 62 (111. 1928) (quoting People v. Johnson, 148
N.E. 255, 258 (III. 1925)).
2. Jon 0. Newman, Beyond "Reasonable Doubt," 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 979, 984
(1993). Justice Newman is the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. Id. at 979.
3. See People v. Williams, 625 N.E.2d 144, 150 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1993)
(describing the question the jury sent to the judge during deliberations).
4. Id. at 146.
5. See id. at 146-47 (discussing the observations of eyewitness Michael Clark and
police officer James Ochoa).
6. Id. at 146. The gang in question was the Gangster Disciples, which was led by a
man named "Santana." Id.
7. Id. Williams's instruction to kill Moore was apparently in retaliation for an
earlier ambush upon Dion Lowe and fellow members of the Gangster Disciples by the
Vice Lords, a rival gang. Id.
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wanted Hawkins to kill the victim.8 Hawkins further indicated that
Williams had accompanied him during the shooting.9
Robert Hawkins's story changed, however, when he took the stand
in Terry Williams's case.'0 Hawkins testified that Dion Lowe, a
fellow gang member who had testified against Williams, was his true
accomplice, and that Lowe, not Williams, had given him the gun and
accompanied him to the shooting." Hawkins further asserted that the
only reason he had named Williams as his accomplice in the first place
was to satisfy the authorities who offered him a plea agreement.' 2
Shortly after it commenced deliberations, the Williams jury sent a
note to the judge requesting a definition of "reasonable doubt."' 3
Given the complexity of the evidence they had to evaluate, it was not
surprising that they should make such a request. The trial judge, how-
ever, expressly refused to answer the jury's inquiry regarding the
meaning of reasonable doubt, explaining that the Illinois "Supreme
Court recommends that no [such] instruction be given ....", Left to
define "reasonable doubt" on its own, the jury convicted Terry Willi-
ams of first degree murder. 5 The appellate court affirmed without a
specific analysis of the judge's refusal to define "reasonable doubt."' 6
In every criminal trial the prosecution has the burden of proving all
the elements of the offense charged.' Moreover, the prosecution must
8. Id. at 147.
9. Id.
10. Id.
II. Id.
12. Id. Hawkins received 29 years for killing Ricky Lee Moore. Id.
13. Id. at 150 (quoting the list the jury sent to the judge). The jury also requested
clarification of the phrase "aiding and abetting," an element the state had to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The Illinois statute which describes the crime of
accountability reads in pertinent part:
A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when...
(c) Either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent
to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or
attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the
offense.
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/5-2(c) (West 1992).
Applying the above language to the Williams case, it is little wonder the jury asked
the judge to define "aiding and abetting." Robert Hawkins, the admitted killer, directly
contradicted Dion Lowe's testimony establishing Williams's accountability. Williams,
625 N.E.2d at 147. If the jury had believed Hawkins rather than Lowe, there would have
remained very little evidence pointing to Williams's accountability.
14. Williams, 625 N.E.2d at 151.
15. Id. at 146. Williams eventually received a forty-year sentence. Id.
16. Id. at 151.
17. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
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prove each of these elements "beyond a reasonable doubt.' ' 8 Although
every criminal jury in the United States must employ this standard,
there currently exists a division among state and federal courts over
whether a definition of "reasonable doubt" should be given in criminal
jury instructions.' 9
Illinois is among a minority of American jurisdictions that refuses to
instruct juries on the definition of this standard.20 The Illinois Pattern
Jury Instructions refuse to provide a definition of "reasonable
doubt.",2' The Illinois Committee on Jury Instructions in Criminal
Cases justifies this decision by referring to several Illinois Supreme
Court decisions which intimate that attempting a definition is futile.
In addition, the Seventh Circuit has held that "[a]n attempt to define
reasonable doubt presents a risk without any real benefit. 23 What do
18. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). In Winship, the Court stated the
following in support of the reasonable doubt standard:
[U]se of the reasonable doubt standard is indispensable to command the
respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law.
It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard
of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being
condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going
about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge
him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his
guilt with utmost certainty.
Id. at 364.
19. See infra part III.
20. See infra part 1II.
21. ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) No. 2.05 (3d ed. 1992).
Specifically, the Committee Note states the following:
The committee recommends that no instruction be given defining the term
"reasonable doubt." In People v. Malmenato, 14 I11. 2d 52, 61, 150 N.E.2d
806, 811 (1958), the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
"Reasonable doubt is a term which needs no elaboration and we have so
frequently discussed the futility of attempting to define it that we might expect
the practice to be discontinued."
Id. (citations omitted).
22. See id. (quoting text of Committee Note to Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction No.
2.05, citing People v. Malmenato, 150 N.E.2d 806 (111.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 899
(1958), and referring to People v. Schuele, 157 N.E. 215 (II. 1927), and People v.
Rogers, 154 N.E. 909 (111. 1926), and People v. Bowlby, 201 N.E.2d 136 (I1. App. 4th
Dist. 1964)).
23. United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 1988). The court explained:
The tortured attempts to define reasonable doubt have yet to produce anything
which has been approved by this court. Moreover, we have recently indicated
that no attempt should be made to define reasonable doubt. The reason for the
prohibition is not that all attempted definitions of reasonable doubt infringe
upon the constitutional rights of a defendant . . . . [Alt best, definitions of
reasonable doubt are unhelpful to a jury, and, at worst, they have the potential
to impair a defendant's constitutional right to have the government prove
each element beyond a reasonable doubt.
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jurisdictions such as Illinois fear?
This Article contends that Illinois courts are short-changing defen-
dants by not instructing juries on the definition of the term "reasonable
doubt." This Article first reviews three recent United States Supreme
Court decisions concerning "reasonable doubt" jury instructions and
illustrates the key role such instructions serve at criminal trials.24
Next, this Article surveys state and federal jurisdictions and describes
the split which currently exists.25 This Article then reviews over a cen-
tury of Illinois case law on the propriety of jury instructions defining
"reasonable doubt., 26 It shows that while Illinois courts pretend to
forbid all parties from defining "reasonable doubt" for the jury, the
reality is quite different. When faced with prosecutorial attempts to
define "reasonable doubt" during closing argument, appellate courts
are not only prone to find "harmless error," indeed, they often ex-
pressly approve the pro-prosecution definitions.27 In addition, this
Article presents empirical evidence suggesting that "reasonable doubt"
is not a self-defining concept and that, without an instruction, jurors
may underestimate the quantum of evidence needed for a criminal con-
viction. 28 Finally, this Article contends that Illinois should provide a
pattern instruction on "reasonable doubt," and that its use in any case
should be left to the discretion of the individual defendant.29
II. REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTIONS AND THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Although it is not clear when the standard of proof of beyond a
reasonable doubt first emerged in Anglo-American jurisprudence,3"
Id. at 1039 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
24. See infra part II.
25. See infra part ll.
26. See infra part IV.
27. See infra part IV.B.
28. See infra part V.
29. See infra part VI.
30. The origin of this standard is somewhat of a mystery. See, e.g., Winship, 397
U.S. at 361 (noting that the standard can be traced at least as far back as the time around
the founding of the nation). There are at least three explanations of the standard's
emergence which, though they conflict in part, reveal how proof beyond a reasonable
doubt sprang from the core principles of our judicial system.
Judge May of Boston provided an explanation of the emergence of the reasonable
doubt standard that became the traditionally accepted view. Hon. John W. May, Some
Rules of Evidence: Reasonable Doubt in Civil and Criminal Cases, 10 AM. L. REV. 642,
651-55 (1876); see also Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of
the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. REV. 507, 508 (1975) (considering Judge May's
article to be the source of Dean Wigmore and Dean McCormick's view of this subject).
According to Judge May, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof developed as a
924 [Vol. 27
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there is no question that this rule has tightly wrapped itself around the
core principles of the American criminal justice system.3 While the
United States Supreme Court has recognized this fact by requiring the
use of the reasonable doubt test in every criminal conviction,32 it has
refused to require that juries receive instructions concerning what this
result of a repulsion to the "fearfully bloody [penal] code" of England. May, supra, at
651. This repulsion prompted judges to require greater amounts of proof for con-
victions. Id. at 652. Judge May attributes this to the'ancient maxim that "it is better to
err on the side of mercy than on the side of justice." Id. at 653. From that ancient
maxim, Sir Matthew Hale invented the phrase: "It is better that five guilty persons
should escape unpunished than one innocent person should die." Id. Sir William
Blackstone doubled the proportion by stating: "The law holds that it is better that ten
guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer." Id. By 1824, the ratio had risen to
99 to I. Id. at 654. The doctrine of reasonable doubt, according to Judge May, was an
undue application of the preference for setting the guilty free over convicting the
innocent. Id. at 656. Judge May further asserts that the reasonable doubt doctrine first
emerged in 1798 in high treason cases tried in Dublin, Ireland. Id.
Another commentator, Professor Anthony Morano, provides a less critical
explanation of the emergence of the reasonable doubt standard. Morano, supra, at 509-
27. According to Professor Morano, the reasonable doubt doctrine actually made
prosecutions easier. Id. at 511. Before the emergence of this doctrine, the presumption
of innocence and the oath requiring jurors to discover and act upon the truth set a high
standard of proof. Id. at 510-11. Around the seventeenth century, the "satisfied
conscience test" emerged. Id. at 511. During the eighteenth century, the standard
became more consistently articulated as "any doubt." Id. at 512. The reasonable doubt
standard, which gave jurors fewer ways to acquit than the preceding "any articulable
doubts" test, was introduced by a prosecutor in 1770 in the celebrated cases surrounding
the Boston Massacre. Id. at 516-17.
Yet another commentator has traced the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt" to late
seventeenth century religious and philosophical ideas. See Barbara J. Shapiro, The Trial
Jury and the Evolution of the Doctrine of "Beyond Reasonable Doubt," in BEYOND
"REASONABLE DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE" (1991). Barbara J. Shapiro contends that
English thinkers of that era began to divide human knowledge into two realms. Id. at 6-
12. In one realm, absolute certainty was a possibility---e.g., in mathematics. In the
other realm-the empirical realm of events-absolute certainty could never be achieved.
Id. at 8-9. The highest level of certainty in this realm was called "moral certainty"-a
certainty which there was not reason to doubt. Id. at 8. Thus, in law, the most man could
aspire to would be proof to a "moral certainty"-i.e., proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
3 1. See, e.g., Winship, 397 U.S. at 363:
The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of
criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of
convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance
for the presumption of innocence-that bedrock "axiomatic and elementary"
principle whose "enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of
our criminal law."
Id. (quoting W. v. Family Court, 247 N.E.2d 253, 259 (N.Y. 1969) (Fuld, C.J.,
dissenting), rev'd, Winship, 397 U.S. at 358).
32. See, e.g., Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 (asserting that a conviction without proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is tantamount to "a lack of fundamental fairness") (quoting
the dissenting opinion in W. v. Family Court, 247 N.E.2d at 259) (Fuld, C.J.,
dissenting)).
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important standard of proof means.33 This Part will examine the way
the Supreme Court has dealt with the reasonable doubt test.
In 1954, in Holland v. United States,34 the Court considered a jury
instruction defining reasonable doubt which was used in a federal
criminal trial.35 In Holland, the Court negatively commented that
"[a]ttempts to explain the term 'reasonable doubt' do not usually result
in making it any clearer to the minds of the jury. 36 The Court, never-
theless, approved of the instruction.37 Lower courts subsequently
began to seize upon the disapproving dictum to support decisions not
to define the term at all.38
The role of reasonable doubt at a criminal trial took on added signifi-
cance in 1970 when the Court, in In re Winship,39explicitly held that
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard was constitutionally re-
quired. 4° Even after Winship, however, courts still divided on
whether a jury instruction defining reasonable doubt was required.4
In the 1990 case of Cage v. Louisiana, 2 the Court, in a per curiam
decision, for the first time found a jury instruction defining reasonable
doubt to be a violation of the Due Process Clause.43 In Cage, defen-
dant Tommy Cage was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced
to death following a jury trial in a Louisiana state court.' He con-
33. Victor v. Nebraska, No. 92-8894, and Sandoval v. California, No. 92-9049,
consolidated as Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1243, reh'g denied, Sandoval v.
California, 114 S. Ct. 1872 (1994) (citing Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 440-41 (1887)).
"The rule may be, and often is, rendered obscure by attempts at definition, which serve to
create doubts instead of removing them." Hopt, 120 U.S. at 440-41.
34. 348 U.S. 121 (1954), reh'g denied, 348 U.S. 932 (1955).
35. Holland, 348 U.S. at 140. The trial judge in the Holland case explained to the
jury that reasonable doubt is ."the kind of doubt ... which you folks in the more serious
and important affairs of your own lives might be willing to act upon." Id. The Supreme
Court noted that it preferred reasonable doubt to be defined as the "kind of doubt that
would make a person hesitate to act," but the trial judge's version was nonetheless
acceptable. Id.
36. Id. (quoting Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880)).
37. Id.
38. Henry A. Diamond, Note, Reasonable Doubt: To Define, Or Not To Define, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1716, 1724 (1990). Diamond also explains that "courts have developed
widely varying opinions as to whether jurors are enlightened" by reasonable doubt
instructions. Id. at 1717.
39. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
40. Id. at 362 (affirming a long line of cases in which the Court expresses the
assumption that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is constitutionally required).
41. See infra part III.
42. 498 U.S. 39 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Estelle v. McGuire,
502 U.S. 62, 73 n.4 (1991).
43. Cage, 498 U.S. at 41.
44. State v. Cage, 554 So. 2d 39, 40 (La. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Cage v. Louisiana,
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tended that the jury instruction which defined reasonable doubt was
defective. 45 The instruction, in pertinent part, stated:
If you entertain a reasonable doubt as to any fact or element
necessary to constitute the defendant's guilt, it is your duty to
give him the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of not
guilty. Even where the evidence demonstrates a probability of
guilt, if it does not establish such guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, you must acquit the accused. This doubt, however, must
be a reasonable one; that is one that is founded upon a real
tangible substantial basis and not upon mere caprice and
conjecture. It must be such doubt as would give rise to a grave
uncertainty, raised in your mind by reasons of the unsatisfactory
character of the evidence or lack thereof. A reasonable doubt is
not a mere possible doubt. It is an actual substantial doubt. It
is a doubt that a reasonable man can seriously entertain. What is
required is not an absolute or mathematical certainty, but a
moral certainty.
46
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and summarily reversed. a7
The Court focused on the phrases "grave uncertainty" and "actual sub-
stantial doubt," which the instruction equated with a "reasonable
doubt."48 The Court found the instruction erroneous because it sug-
gested a "higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the
reasonable-doubt standard."4 9 The Court also criticized the use of the
term "moral certainty"'5 and suggested that it should be "evidentiary
certainty.'
498 U.S. 39 (1990).
45. Cage, 554 So. 2d at 41.
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. Cage, 498 U.S. at 41.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. The phrase "moral certainty" was first employed in 1824 in an attempt to
elucidate the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt." May, supra note 30, at 658. Judge
May considered "moral certainty" to be just as ambiguous as the phrase it attempted to
explain. id. See also Shapiro, supra note 30 (discussing "moral certainty").
51. Cage, 498 U.S. at 41. In a short, three-page opinion, the Court stated:
It is plain to us that the words "substantial" and "grave," as they are
commonly understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is required for
acquittal under the reasonable-doubt standard. When those statements are then
considered with the reference to "moral certainty," rather than evidentiary
certainty, it becomes clear that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the
instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that
required by the Due Process Clause.
Id. (footnote omitted). On remand, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the erroneous
jury instruction was subject to the harmless error standard, and that the error was
harmless. State v. Cage, 583 So. 2d 1125, 1127-29 (La. 1991).
927
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Three years later, in Sullivan v. Louisiana,2 the Supreme Court
decided whether a deficient reasonable doubt instruction could be
harmless error.5 3 The trial court in Sullivan gave a reasonable doubt
jury instruction very similar to the one in Cage.54 The Su reme Court
unanimously held that such an error is always prejudicial. 5 The Court
held that two different constitutional values were implicated in such a
defective instruction: the Due Process right to proof beyond a reason-
able doubt 6 and the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a trial by jury. 7 A
constitutionally defective reasonable doubt instruction, the Court
reasoned, essentially results in no real jury verdict within the meaning
of the Sixth Amendment.5 8 Thus, this type of error can, in the par-
52. 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993).
53. Id. at 2080.
54. The following is the instruction given in the Sullivan case:
If you entertain any reasonable doubt as to any fact or element necessary to
constitute the defendant's guilt, it is your sworn duty to give him the benefit
of that doubt and return a verdict of acquittal. Even where the evidence
demonstrates a probability of guilt, yet if it does not establish it beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must acquit the accused. This doubt must be a reasonable
one; that is, one founded upon a real, tangible, substantial basis, and not upon
mere caprice, fancy or conjecture. It must be such a doubt as would give rise to
a grave uncertainty, raised in your minds by reason of the unsatisfactory
character of the evidence; one that would make you feel that you had not an
abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the defendant's guilt. If, after
giving a fair and impartial consideration to all of the facts in the case, you find
the evidence unsatisfactory upon any single point indispensably necessary to
constitute the defendant's guilt, this would give rise to such a reasonable doubt
as would justify you in rendering a verdict of not guilty.
A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt. It should be an actual or
substantial doubt. It is such a doubt as a reasonable person would seriously
entertain. It is a serious doubt for which you could give good reason.
State v. Sullivan, 596 So. 2d 177, 185 (La. 1992) (alteration in original) (quoting trial
transcript at 566-68).
55. Sullivan, 113 S. Ct. at 2082-83. In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, reh'g
denied, 444 U.S. 890 (1979), the Supreme Court recognized that failure to instruct on
reasonable doubt (as opposed to defining reasonable doubt) is never subject to harmless
error. Id. at 320 n.14.
56. Id. at 2080 (citing Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 and Cool v. United States, 409 U.S.
100, 104 (1972) (per curiam)).
57. Id. at 2080-81. The Court reasoned that:
[T]he Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury verdict are interrelated. It would
not satisfy the Sixth Amendment to have a jury determine that the defendant is
probably guilty, and then leave it up to the judge to determine (as Winship
requires) whether he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, the
jury verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a jury verdict of guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 2081.
5 8. Id. at 2081.
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lance of Arizona v. Fulminante,"9 be considered a "structural defect"
not susceptible to harmless error review.60
Finally, in 1994, the Court consolidated two cases under the name
Victor v. Nebraska6' in order to examine the constitutional propriety of
the reasonable doubt instructions used by Nebraska and California
state courts.62 In the course of holding that both instructions correctly
conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt, the court reflected on the
general idea of reasonable doubt jury instructions. 63
While Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court stated that "the
Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable
doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course," 64 Justice
59. 499 U.S. 279, reh'g denied, 500 U.S. 938 (1991).
60. Sullivan, 113 S. Ct. at 2083 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). In Fulminante, the
Court reasoned that structural defects affect "the framework within which the trial
proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself." Fulminante, 499 U.S.
at 310.
61. Victor v. Nebraska, No. 92-8894, and Sandoval v. California, No. 92-9049,
consolidated as Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, reh'g denied, Sandoval v.
California, 114 S. Ct. 1872 (1994).
62. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1242.
63. Id. at 1247-51. The Court accepted Sandoval's "premise that 'moral certainty,'
standing alone, might not be recognized by modern jurors as a synonym for 'proof
beyond a reasonable doubt."' Id. at 1247. But because the jurors in Sandoval were also
told "they must have 'an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the
charge,"' the instruction was not unconstitutional because the abiding conviction
language "correctly states the government's burden of proof." Id. (citations omitted).
Although the Court did not condone the use of the phrase, it concluded that it was not
"reasonably likely that the jury understood the words moral certainty either as
suggesting a standard of proof lower than due process requires or as allowing conviction
on factors other than the government's proof." Id. at 1248.
In Victor the defendant's contention was that "equating a reasonable doubt with a
,substantial doubt' overstated the degree of doubt necessary for acquittal." Id. at 1250.
The Supreme Court rejected the argument because in the context of the instructions,
"'actual and substantial doubt"' was "'distinguished from a doubt arising from mere
possibility, from bare imagination, or from fanciful conjecture."' Id. (citation omitted)
(alteration in original). The instruction in Victor also contained "an alternative
definition of reasonable doubt: a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate
to act." Id. Here, too, the Court did "not think it reasonably likely that the jury would
have interpreted this instruction to indicate that the doubt must be anything other than a
reasonable one." Id. The Court recognized that "[t]he Due Process Clause requires the
government to prove a criminal defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and trial
courts must avoid defining reasonable doubt so as to lead the jury to convict on a lesser
showing than due process requires." Id. at 1251. The Court held that taken as a whole
the instructions in these cases "'correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to
the jury,"' and there was no "reasonable likelihood" that jurors "applied the instruction
in a way that violated the Constitution." Id. (citation omitted).
64. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1243 (citing Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 440-41 (1887)).
"The rule may be, and often is, rendered obscure by attempts at definition, which serve to
create doubts instead of removing them." Id.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Ginsburg's concurrence provided a strong endorsement of courts
trying to define the concept for juries:
[W]e have never held that the concept of reasonable doubt is
undefinable, or that trial courts should not, as a matter of course,
provide a definition. Nor, contrary to the Court's suggestion,
[citation omitted] have we ever held that the Constitution does
not require trial courts to define reasonable doubt.
Because the trial judges in fact defined reasonable doubt in
both jury charges we review, we need not decide whether the
Constitution required them to do so.
65
Thus, although the Court's recent "trilogy" of Cage, Sullivan, and
Victor makes it clear that a court does not per se violate the Consti-
tution by failing to define "beyond a reasonable doubt," there is no
constitutional reason why it should not be defined. 66 Indeed, at least
according to Justice Ginsburg, there are strong reasons for requiring
courts to do SO. 6 7
III. THE SPLIT AMONG COURTS OVER WHETHER To DEFINE
"REASONABLE DOUBT"
Illinois is in a distinct minority of jurisdictions which refuse to allow
trial courts to define "reasonable doubt" for a jury. Among the juris-
dictions which appear to make such an instruction mandatory are the
Eighth Circuit,6 Idaho,69 Missouri,70 Montana,7 1 New Hampshire,72
65. Id. at 1253 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
66. See supra. notes 42-65 and accompanying text.
67. See Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1253 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). In Victor, Justice
Ginsburg suggested the following:
[Tihe argument for defining the concept is strong. While judges and lawyers
are familiar with the reasonable doubt standard, the words "beyond a
reasonable doubt" are not self-defining for jurors. Several studies of jury
behavior have concluded that "jurors are often confused about the meaning of
reasonable doubt," when that term is left undefined. Thus, even if definitions
of reasonable doubt are necessarily imperfect, the alternative-refusing to
define the concept at all-is obviously not preferable.
Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
68. United States v. Harris, 974 F.2d 84, 85 (8th Cir. 1992) (using "hesitate to act"
language, the Harris court cited the proper and preferred instruction, Model Criminal Jury
Instruction for the District Court of the Eighth Circuit, No. 3.11 (1984)); United States
v. Jensen, 561 F.2d 1297, 1300 (8th Cir. 1977) ("This circuit has repeatedly stated that
the definition of reasonable doubt should be phrased in terms of hesitation to act.");
Friedman v. United States, 381 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir. 1967) ("In the first place, it was
the court's duty to instruct on the meaning of 'reasonable doubt' and failure to do so
upon request would constitute error.").
69. State v. Rhoades, 822 P.2d 960, 979 (Idaho 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 962
(1993). The Idaho rule is as follows: "When the term 'reasonable doubt' appears in a
jury instruction, and when the jurors must understand it and apply it, 'the term should be
930 [Vol. 27
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Pennsylvania," Rhode Island,74 South Dakota,75 and Washington.76
defined more precisely so that there is no question in the jurors' minds with respect to
the concept."' Rhoades, 822 P.2d at 979 (citing State v. Holm, 478 P.2d 284, 288
(Idaho 1970)) (emphasis added); State v. Holm, 478 P.2d 284, 288 (Idaho 1970)
("Hereafter whenever the concept of reasonable doubt is at issue, i.e., in all criminal
cases, the defendant is entitled to such instruction." (emphasis added)).
The only instruction defining reasonable doubt which the Idaho court deems
"appropriate" is the California Jury Instruction. Rhoades, 822 P.2d at 979 (citing State
v. Cotton, 602 P.2d 71, 75 (Idaho 1979)). The Idaho courts review a deviation from that
instruction to determine whether the given instruction misstated the law or was so
confusing and argumentative as to mislead the jury. Id.
70. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.070(4) (Vernon 1992). The applicable Missouri statute
reads: "In every trial for a criminal offense the court shall instruct the jury in writing
upon all questions of law arising in the case which are necessary for their information in
giving the verdict, which instructions shall include a definition of the term reasonable
doubt ..... Id. (emphasis added).
71. State v. Flesch, 839 P.2d 1270, 1274 (Mont. 1992). The Montana Supreme
Court found a reasonable doubt instruction patterned after Model Montana Criminal
Instruction No. 1-004 proper. Flesch, 839 P.2d at 1274. The state supreme court has
held that the reasonable doubt instruction patterned after Model Montana Criminal Jury
Instruction No. 1-004 should be used in criminal cases and that no further elaboration
would be needed because more complicated instructions have a greater tendency to
confuse the jury than to clarify the burden of proof. State v. Goodwin, 813 P.2d 953,
961 (Mont. 1991) (citing State v. Lucero, 693 P.2d 511, 516 (Mont. 1984)), overruled
on other grounds by State'v. Turner, 864 P.2d 235, 241 (Mont. 1993).
The court has also suggested the use of the following instruction: "Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable person would
rely and act upon it in the most important of his own affairs. Beyond a reasonable doubt
does not mean beyond any doubt or beyond a shadow of a doubt." State v. Lucero, 693
P.2d 511, 516 (Mont. 1984) (citing pattern instruction No. 1-004 and reversing as
erroneous a reasonable doubt instruction which deprived the defendant of due process).
72. State v. Aubert, 421 A.2d 124, 127 (N.H. 1980). The New Hampshire Supreme
Court held:
Though we acknowledge the difficulty inherent in the task, this court feels
strongly that a jury must be given some assistance in understanding the
concept. We feel that there is merit in the belief that the definition of
reasonable doubt is perhaps the most important aspect of the closing
instruction to a jury in a criminal trial.
Id. (emphasis added) (advising judges to use the model instruction defined in State v.
Wentworth, 395 A.2d 858 (N.H. 1978) without adding anything to it).
73. Commonwealth v. Young, 317 A.2d 258, 262-63 (Pa. 1974) (reversing for denial
of due process where full and adequate charge on reasonable doubt was not given). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court asserted: "[o]ur cases require that the jury be given a
positive instruction fully and accurately defining reasonable doubt .... In the absence
of a proper reasonable doubt charge, an accused is denied his right to a fair trial." Id.
(emphasis added).
74. State v. Desrosiers, 559 A.2d 641, 645 (R.I. 1989). In Desrosiers, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court held that "[iun charging the jury, a trial justice must explain the
definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (emphasis added).
75. Two cases by the state supreme court set down the rule for South Dakota. In State
v. Bult, 351 N.W.2d 731 (S.D. 1984), the court held that the "[defendant] was entitled to
a definition of reasonable doubt." Id. at 736. After expressing dismay at the usage of
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In addition, several jurisdictions, including Arizona," California,"
Nevada, 79 and Ohio,8 have a statutorily defined instruction for
"moral certainty" language in defining reasonable doubt, the court in State v. Olson,
408 N.W.2d 748 (S.D. 1987) admonished: "ITihe trial courts are reminded to either
annotate their old pattern instruction sets or utilize the new pattern instructions which
properly set forth the applicable law." Id. at 754 n.2.
76. State v. Coe, 684 P.2d 668, 677 (Wash. 1984) (reversing due to combination of
errors and noting that an instruction which equates reasonable doubt with substantial
doubt should not be given). Washington law provides in pertinent part:
In every criminal case, there are indispensable functions that must be
performed by the court's instructions to the jury: (1) To declare that each
element of the crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and define the
standard of reasonable doubt .... The function of informing the jury of the
reasonable doubt standard can only be achieved by a specific instruction.
Id. (emphasis added).
77. State v. Portillo, 898 P.2d 970, 973-74 (Ariz. 1995). The Arizona Supreme Court
recently mandated that beginning January 1, 1996, Arizona trial courts must give the
definition of reasonable doubt promulgated by the Federal Judicial Center. Id. See infra
notes 234-35 and accompanying text for discussion of the federal instruction.
78. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1096 (West 1992). The California law provides:
It is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs,
and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary
doubt. It is that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and
consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that
condition that they can not say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral
certainty, of the truth of the charge.
Id.
79. NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.211 (1991). In Nevada, a statutory definition is given and
trial courts are forbidden to use any other definition:
I. A reasonable doubt is one based on reason. It is not mere possible doubt,
but is such a doubt as would govern or control a person in the more weighty
affairs of life. If in the minds of jurors, after the entire comparison and
consideration of all the evidence, are in such a condition that they can say
they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, there is not a
reasonable doubt. Doubt to be reasonable must be actual, not mere possibility
or speculation. 2. No other definition of reasonable doubt may be given by
the court to juries in criminal actions in this state.
Id.
80. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05 (Anderson 1991). The applicable Ohio law
reads:
(B) As part of its charge to the jury in a criminal case, the court shall read the
definitions of "reasonable doubt" and "proof beyond a reasonable doubt,"
contained in division (D) of this section.
(D) "Reasonable doubt" is present when the jurors, after they have carefully
considered and compared all the evidence, cannot say they are firmly
convinced of the truth of the charge. It is a doubt based on reason and common
sense. Reasonable doubt is not mere possible doubt, because everything
relating to human affairs or depending on moral evidence is open to some
possible or imaginary doubt. "Proof beyond a reasonable doubt" is proof of
such character that an ordinary person would be willing to rely and act upon it
in the most important of his own affairs.
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"4reasonable doubt."
Another group of jurisdictions allows "reasonable doubt" to be
defined only when requested by the defendant. These include the
Third Circuit, 8' Tenth Circuit,82 District of Columbia Circuit,83
Florida," Maryland,85 New Jersey,6 and North Carolina.17
Id.
81. Blatt v. United States, 60 F.2d 481, 481 (3d Cir. 1932) (finding failure to instruct
following a defense request prejudicial, reversible error).
82. United States v. Lutchfield, 959 F.2d 1514, 1521 (10th Cir. 1992) (preferring the
"hesitate to act" form of definition of reasonable doubt). See also Monk v. United
States, 901 F.2d 885, 890 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding "substantial doubt" and "willing to
act" language constitutionally defective); United States v. Pepe, 501 F.2d 1142, 1143
(10th Cir. 1974). In Pepe, the court stated:
At the outset, we recognize that the reasonable doubt standard is a
constitutional cornerstone of the criminal justice system. A defendant is
entitled to have his jury apprised of this standard and its corollary, the
presumption of innocence, and is entitled to have the meaning of reasonable
doubt explained to the jury.
Id. at 1143. Additionally, in Holland v. United States, 209 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), affd,
348 U.S. 121 (1954), the Tenth Circuit held: "the accused is entitled to a definition of
the term 'reasonable doubt,' and failure to instruct upon request has been held to
constitute error." Id. at 523.
83. Mundy v. United States, 176 F.2d 32, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1949). After noting that
"[the defendant's] silence at the bench was a waiver of the court's omission of a
definition of reasonable doubt[,]" the Mundy Court added that it "regard[ed] it as better
practice to define the term in each case no matter how experienced the jurors may be."
Id. at 33.
In Schencks v. United States, 2 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1924), where the defendant
requested a definition of reasonable doubt and the court did not so charge the jury, the
court held that "It]he instruction asked for or its equivalent should in our opinion have
been given." Id. at 187.
84. Barwicks v. State, 82 So. 2d 356, 358 (Fla. 1955) (giving no instruction
defining reasonable doubt where defendant's requested instruction was not proper). The
Florida Supreme Court held that: "a failure to define the term 'reasonable doubt' does not
constitute reversible error unless a definition thereof is requested by a proper
instruction." Id. at 358.
85. Williams v. State, 585 A.2d 209, 213 (Md. 1991). The Maryland Supreme Court
set down the rule as follows: "Because the reasonable doubt standard is an indispensable
constitutionally mandated component of every criminal proceeding, a requested
instruction explaining its import is applicable within the meaning of Md. Rule 757(b)
[Now Rule 4-325, entitled 'Instructions to the Jury']." Id. at 213 (citing Lansdowne v.
State, 412 A.2d 88 (Md. 1980)).
In Lansdowne v. State, 412 A.2d 88 (Md. 1980), the Maryland Supreme Court held
"under Md. Rule 757(b), a trial judge in a criminal case, must give an instruction
correctly explaining 'reasonable doubt' if requested by the accused." Id. at 93 (emphasis
added). The Lansdowne court noted that "[e]ven judges ... have difficulty construing the
meaning of 'reasonable doubt."' Id.
Under Md. Rule 4-325(c), the trial court, when asked, "shall instruct the jury as to the
applicable law and the extent to which the instructions are binding." Henry v. State,
596 A.2d 1024, 1040-41 (Md. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 972 (1992) (referencing
Maryland Rule 4-325 in a case not dealing with a reasonable doubt instruction). Failure
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There are jurisdictions which leave the decision of whether or not to
instruct to the discretion of the trial court. This group includes the
First Circuit,88 Sixth Circuit,89 Ninth Circuit, 90 Eleventh Circuit, 9'
to do so shall result in error. Henry, 596 A.2d at 1041.
86. State v. Linker, Ill A. 35, 36 (N.J. 1920). The New Jersey Supreme Court held
that if a judge receives a request to define reasonable doubt, "he ... undoubtedly [is]
required to define it." Id. at 36.
87. State v. Montgomery, 417 S.E.2d 742, 748 (N.C. 1992). In Montgomery, the
North Carolina Supreme Court held: 'The trial court has the duty to define the term
'reasonable doubt' when requested to give such an instruction to the jury." Id. at 748
(emphasis added) (citing State v. Shaw, 200 S.E.2d 585 (N.C. 1973)). This duty,
however, is not activated until a request for definition is made: 'The trial judge need not
define reasonable doubt unless requested to do so, and if he undertakes the definition he
is not limited to the use of an exact formula." State v. Shaw, 200 S.E.2d 585, 590 (N.C.
1973); accord State v. Watson, 240 S.E.2d 440, 446 (N.C. 1978).
88. United States v. Littlefield, 840 F.2d 143, 147 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
860 (1988). The First Circuit gives considerable discretion to the trial judge:
We do not wish to be interpreted as prescribing a preferred approach for
instructing on reasonable doubt, suitable for all juries in all cases.
Specifically, we do not mean that judges should not provide proper
explanations of 'beyond a reasonable doubt' if and to the degree they are so
inclined.
Id. at 147 (emphasis added). However, Judge Torruella, dissenting in Littlefield, stated
that: "I am of the opinion that the failure to grant an instruction explaining the term
'proof beyond a reasonable doubt' is an error of constitutional dimension, striking at
the very heart of the presumption of innocence." Id. at 151 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
89. Whiteside v. Parke, 705 F.2d 869 (6th Cir.) (holding that the failure to instruct
on reasonable doubt was not constitutional error), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 843 (1983).
90. United States v. Velasquez, 980 F.2d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2979 (1993). The court in Velasquez stated the Ninth Circuit's position:
"[Slome Ninth Circuit opinions have expressed a preference for the 'hesitate to act'
language, failure to use that language does not necessarily constitute reversible error.
Other definitions of reasonable doubt are permissible." Id. at 1278 (citations omitted).
The Ninth Circuit's resolution of the question of defining the reasonable doubt
standard has undergone recent change. For example, in United States v. Nolasco, 926
F.2d 869 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 833 (1991), the court stated: "Upon
reconsideration, we overrule Wosepka's distinction between simple and complex cases,
reaffirm Witt, and return the decision to define reasonable doubt to the sound discretion
of the trial court." Id. at 872. In addition, in United States v. Witt, 648 F.2d 608 (9th
Cir. 1981), even though the defendant requested an instruction defining reasonable
doubt, the court held that "the district court was not required to define reasonable doubt
.... Although a proper definition is always appropriate, the decision whether to define
reasonable doubt should be left to the court's discretion." Id. at 610-11.
91. United States v. Daniels, 986 F.2d 451, 456-57 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1615 (1994). In reviewing a reasonable doubt definition tracking the
Eleventh Circuit's pattern jury instructions, the Daniels court "recognize[d] the broad
discretion of the trial judge in formulating a jury instruction." and expressly upheld the
challenged portion of the charge as proper. Id. at 456-57 (citing UNITED STATES
ELEVENTH CIRCUrr DisTRiCr JUDGES Ass'N PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL CASES,
BASIC INSTRUCTION 3 (1985)).
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Louisiana,92 and Minnesota.
93
Some jurisdictions have implied that a "reasonable doubt" instruc-
tion should be given. These jurisdictions include the Second Circuit,94
Alaska,95 Indiana,96 Iowa, 97 Maine,98 Nebraska, 99 and Connecticut.,°°
92. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 804A(3) (West 1992). The Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent part: "The court may, but is not required to,
define 'the presumption of innocence' or 'reasonable doubt' or give any other or further
charge upon the same than that contained in this article." Id. (emphasis added). See also
State v. Gaines, 354 So. 2d 548, 552 (La. 1978) (holding that the trial court is not
required by statute to define reasonable doubt).
93. State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89, 105 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1132
(1981). The Minnesota Supreme Court held: "Defining the term should be at the option
of the trial judge even though a defining instruction is tendered. Lack of definition
would not appear to be prejudicial." Id. at 105 (emphasis added).
94. United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 242 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, Cruz v. United
States, 498 U.S. 906 (1990). In Torres, the court "cautioned against departures from the
traditional formulations of the reasonable doubt [definition]." Id. at 242 (citing United
States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1983)). In Ivic, the Second Circuit asserted:
We cannot see what is wrong with the instruction recommended in I DEVITT &
BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 1!.14 (3d ed. 1977)
.... At least in the absence of an indication that a jury is having trouble in
applying the standard instruction, trial judges would be exceedingly well
advised to use that instruction rather than improvise variations upon it.
That model instruction reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
It is not required that the government prove guilt beyond all possible
doubt. The test is one of reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt
based upon reason and common sense-the kind of doubt that would make
a reasonable person hesitate to act. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt
must, therefore, be proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable
person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it in the most important of
his own affairs. The jury will remember that a defendant is never to be
convicted on mere suspicion or conjecture.
Ivic, 700 F.2d at 69 (quoting I DEVITT & BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS § 11.14 (3d ed. 1977)).
95. Avery v. State, 514 P.2d 637, 642-43 (Alaska 1973) (condemning usage of
"moral certainty" language). In Avery, the Alaska Supreme Court held: "In our view the
instruction suggested by the Supreme Court in Holland v. United States is preferable: a
doubt that would cause prudent men to hesitate before acting in matters of importance to
themselves." Id. at 642-43 (emphasis added).
The Alaska court preferred the Holland version of the definition stating that "[wihile
we do not wish to be read as setting down an invariable standard form of instruction, we
will in the future require greater clarity in instructions defining reasonable doubt."
Rivett v. State, 578 P.2d 946, 950 (Alaska 1978) (emphasis added).
96. McKinley v. State, 379 N.E.2d 968, 969 (Ind. 1978). Upon noting that jury
instructions on reasonable doubt should address "both the doubt and the degree of
certainty needed to find reasonable doubt," the Indiana Supreme Court stated that "we
believe that the trial courts would better serve the administration of justice if they would
address themselves to a consideration of the pattern of criminal instructions which are
available to all courts and thereby minimize the discussion of semantics which is
present in this type of appeal." Id. at 969 (emphasis added).
97. State v. Bishop, 387 N.W.2d 554, 560 (Iowa 1986). The Iowa Supreme Court
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On the other hand, there are jurisdictions which, similar to Illinois,
refuse to define "reasonable doubt." These include the Fourth Cir-
cuit,' ' Seventh Circuit,' ° Kentucky,0 3 Mississippi,' 'Oklahoma, 0 5
"approved [Iowa Uniform Jury Instruction No. 1081 defining reasonable doubt." Id. at
560.
98. State v. Uffelman, 626 A.2d 340, 342 (Me. 1993), cert. denied, Uffelman v.
Maine, 114 S. Ct. 699 (1994). The Maine Supreme Court affirmed its "previously stated
preference concerning a reasonable doubt instruction that the trial court must convey to
the jurors the knowledge that before they may convict a defendant of a criminal offense
the evidence must be sufficient to convince them of the defendant's guilt and that the
degree of conviction which they must have is a conscientious belief that the charge is
almost certainly true." Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
99. State v. Beard, 381 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Neb. 1986). The Nebraska Supreme Court
noted specific approval of Nebraska Jury Instruction 14.08 and "[rejected] an argument
that it is confusing, contradictory, and a misstatement of the traditional understanding
of a reasonable doubt." Id. at 174. The court also acknowledged that "while there is
authority suggesting it is perhaps better not to attempt to define reasonable doubt at all,
some of that authority nonetheless rejects a per se rule that such an attempt requires
reversal of a conviction." Id.
100. State v. Tucker, 629 A.2d 1067, 1084 (Conn. 1993). The Tucker court found
that the jury instructions given were "the same or similar to jury instructions that
previously have been approved by this court." Id. at 1084 (citing State v. Leecan, 504
A.2d 480 (Conn. 1986)) (emphasis added). The Leecan court held that "an instruction
that a reasonable doubt is 'one for which you can, in your own mind, conscientiously
give a reason' does not violate any constitutional right of a defendant." State v. Leecan,
504 A.2d 480, 492 (Conn.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986).
101. United States v. Adkins, 937 F.2d 947, 950 (4th Cir. 1991). The Fourth
Circuit's position is as follows:
[This Circuit] has repeatedly warned against giving the jury definitions of
reasonable doubt, because definitions tend to impermissibly lessen the burden
of proof. Even where the defendant requests that reasonable doubt be defined, a
district court need not do so. The only exception to our categorical disdain for
definition is when the jury specifically requests it.
Id. at 950 (citations omitted). In Murphy v. Holland, 776 F.2d 470 (4th Cir. 1985),
vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 1138 (1986), the Fourth Circuit confirmed its
stance: "[W]e remain unwavering in our belief that trial courts should refrain from
charging the jury on reasonable doubt unless such guidance is made unavoidable by a
specific request from a confused jury." Id. at 479.
102. United States v. Glass, 846 F.2d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1988). In the Seventh
Circuit it is "inappropriate for judges to give an instruction defining 'reasonable doubt,'
and it is equally inappropriate for trial counsel to provide their own definition." Id. at
387. According to the Seventh Circuit, "[tihe tortured attempts to define reasonable
doubt have yet to produce anything which has been approved by this court." United
States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 1988).
103. KENTUCKY CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 9.56 (1994). The Kentucky Code of
Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent part:
Rule 9.56. Reasonable Doubt. (1) In every case the jury shall be instructed
substantially as follows: "The law presumes a defendant to be innocent of a
crime, and the indictment shall not be considered as evidence or as having any
weight against him. You shall find the defendant not guilty unless you are
satisfied from the evidence alone, and beyond a reasonable doubt that he is
guilty. If upon the whole case you have a reasonable doubt that he is guilty,
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Texas," and Wyoming. 10 7 A related group of jurisdictions expresses
a preference against defining the term. This group includes the Fifth
Circuit,'°8 Oregon,'°9 South Carolina, "° Vermont,"' Virginia,' 2 and
you shall find him not guilty." (2) The instruction should not attempt to
define the term 'reasonable doubt.'
Id. (emphasis added).
104. Barnes v. State, 532 So. 2d 1231, 1235 (Miss. 1988). The Mississippi
Supreme Court asserts that "reasonable doubt defines itself; it therefore needs no
definition by the court." Id. at 1235 (citing Pittman v. State, 350 So. 2d 67, 71 (Miss.
1977)).
In Pittman v. State, 350 So. 2d 67 (Miss. 1977), the state supreme court found that
error in defining reasonable doubt was not prejudicial, and the court held: "[T]he word
'reasonable' sufficiently modifies and restricts the word 'doubt' . . . . [An instruction
attempting to define the words 'reasonable doubt' should not be given, either for the
prosecution or defense." Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
105. Grant v. State, 703 P.2d 943, 946 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985). In Grant, the court
upheld the trial judge's refusal to tender an instruction upon the request of the defendant
and stated that "the long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that trial judges should not
define [reasonable doubt]." Id. at 946 (emphasis added).
Oklahoma courts clearly hold that it is error for the trial court or prosecution to
attempt to define reasonable doubt to the jury. Williams v. State, 658 P.2d 499, 500
(Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (citation omitted) (holding that the cumulative effect of
arguments of prosecutor, including attempt to define reasonable doubt to jury, denied
defendant a fair trial and justified reversal); Pannel v. State, 640 P.2d 568, 570 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1982) (holding that commands of judge during voir dire did not require
reversal and stating that "[a]n attempt to define 'reasonable doubt' by a trial judge is
reversible error," and citing Jones v. State, 554 P.2d 830 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976)). But
cf. Jones, 554 P.2d at 835 (stating that reasonable doubt definitions have been
"condemned" by Oklahoma courts "from the territorial days to the present," and holding
that the error was harmless due to the total weight of the evidence against the defendant).
The court in Jones stated that "'if it should appear that the effect of such instruction is
not one of injury to the defendant, we will not reverse the cause solely on the basis of
such instruction."' Id. at 835 (quoting Young v. State, 373 P.2d 273, 278 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1962)).
106. Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d ill, 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). In Texas, the
"legislature has not defined the term 'reasonable doubt.' Because the term has not been
defined by statute, the term is to be understood in its usual acceptance in common
language and need not be defined in the charge to the jury." Id. at 118. See also TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 3.01 (West 1992). The Texas Criminal Code provides in
pertinent part: "All words, phrases and terms used in this Code are to be taken and
understood in their usual acceptation in common language, except where specially
defined." Id.
107. Blakely v. State, 542 P.2d 857, 861-62 (Wyo. 1975). In Wyoming "a proper
jury instruction on reasonable doubt within the scope of Holland is by use of the words
'reasonable doubt' themselves without further definition. The phrase 'reasonable doubt'
is considered self-explanatory." Id. at 861-62 (emphasis added).
108. Thompson v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1054, 1060-61 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1035 (1987). The Thompson court held:
[Tihe failure to include a definition of 'reasonable doubt' does not deprive a
defendant of due process. Although the jury must be instructed that the state
bears the burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
attempts by trial courts to define 'reasonable doubt' have been disfavored by
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West Virginia.' 13
Thus, Illinois finds itself in a shrinking group of jurisdictions which
categorically refuse to allow reasonable doubt to be defined for the
jury. The recent attention the United States Supreme Court has given
this issue in Victor v. Nebraska"4 may very well result in even more
jurisdictions deciding to mandate the use of such an instruction. 1 5
this court. Such attempts often result in using the term itself in the definition
and serve only to confuse the concept in the minds of jurors.
Id. at 1060-61 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
109. State v. Castrejon, 856 P.2d 616, 619 (Or. 1993). The Oregon Supreme Court
has "voiced agreement with [the] proposition [that the phrase "reasonable doubt" is its
own best explanation]." Id. at 619 (quoting State v. Williams, 828 P.2d 1006, 1019
(Or. 1992)). However, an instruction shall not constitute error unless it misleads the
jury to believe that it can convict on a lesser degree of proof than that required. Id.
110. State v. Manning, 409 S.E.2d 372, 375 (S.C. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 914
(1992). In Manning, the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded:
[Tihe term 'reasonable doubt' may be best understood when the jury is simply
instructed to give its plain and ordinary meaning. In an abundance of caution,
we suggest the trial bench give no further definition than that approved by the
United States Supreme Court in Holland:
A reasonable doubt is the kind of doubt that would cause a reasonable
person to hesitate to act.
Id. at 375 (citation omitted) (paraphrasing Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140
(1954)). In an earlier decision the South Carolina Supreme Court held: "mere attempts to
define reasonable doubt do not constitute reversible error per se." State v. Johnson, 410
S.E.2d 547, 553-54 (S.C. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 993 (1992) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added). Subsequent to the Johnson decision, however, the court held that the
following instruction deprived the defendant of his due process rights and warranted
reversal: "A reasonable doubt is a doubt for which you can assign a reason. It is a doubt
arising from the evidence presented or lack of evidence that created a strong uncertainty
in your minds as to the defendant's guilty [sic]." State v. Baker, 424 S.E.2d 492, 493
(S.C. 1992).
111. State v. McMahon, 603 A.2d 1128, 1129 (Vt. 1992) (discussing problems
inherent in attempts to define reasonable doubt and implying that not defining it is
preferred). In McMahon, the Vermont Supreme Court noted it had "never held that a
defendant is entitled to an explanation of 'reasonable doubt' and the court did not err in
declining to offer a definition of that phrase once it had correctly stated the rule." Id. at
1129.
112. Cooper v. Commonwealth, 345 S.E.2d 775, 777 (Va. 1986). In Cooper, the
Virginia Supreme Court held: "'[Although the] instruction as given has been approved
by this court . . . instructions attempting to define reasonable doubt should be
discouraged as it is highly probable that any definition devised would be less
illuminating than the expression itself."' Id. at 777 (quoting Strawderman v.
Commonwealth, 108 S.E.2d 376, 379 (Va. 1959)) (emphasis added).
113. Means v. Sidiropolis, 401 S.E.2d 447, 451 n.1 (W.Va. 1990). The West
Virginia Supreme Court has "always discouraged jury instructions attempting to define
reasonable doubt." Id. at 451 n.1 (emphasis added).
114. 114 S. Ct. 1239, reh'g denied, Sandoval v. California, 114 S. Ct. 1872 (1994).
See also supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text (discussing Victor).
115. See, e.g., supra note 77 (describing Arizona's recent decision to mandate use of
such an instruction in all criminal cases).
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Since the Supreme Court's decision in Victor, however, the Fourth
District of the Illinois Appellate-Court has refused to reconsider the
issue. 1 6 Illinois courts need to understand the state's tortuous history
on the issue of defining reasonable doubt before deciding what course
to take in the future. The next Part addresses this history.
IV. THE HISTORY, MYTH, AND REALITY OF DEFINING
REASONABLE DOUBT IN ILLINOIS
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the Illinois Supreme
Court consistently approved attempts to define the phrase "reasonable
doubt."' 17 Around the turn of the century, however, the court began to
doubt the efficacy of such definitions." 8 This doubt progressed to a
proscription of any attempt to define the standard. '9 The myth that the
phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt" is self-defining has precipitated
the court's aversion to defining these very important words.' 20 This
Part will trace the history of the Illinois Supreme Court's various ap-
proaches to the issue of defining reasonable doubt.' 2' This Part will
also establish that while the court prevents defense attorneys and
judges from instructing juries about the meaning of reasonable doubt,
it often refuses to reverse cases in which prosecutors offer their own
definitions during trial.' 22
A. The Illinois History
One of the earliest Illinois cases approving an instruction on
reasonable doubt is Pate v. People, 23 decided in 1846. In Pate, the
Illinois Supreme Court, without citation, approved a reasonable doubt
instruction which informed the jury that "[t]here should be more than a
bare probability of the defendant's innocence."'' 24 Two dissenters
116. People v. Failor, 649 N.E.2d 1342 (II1. App. 4th Dist.), cert. denied, 657
N.E.2d 629 (111. 1995).
117. See infra notes 123-37 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 143-53 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 154-66 and accompanying text.
121. See infra part IV.A.
122. See infra part IV.B.
123. 8 I11. (3 Gilm.) 644 (1846).
124. Id. at 661, 664. Specifically, the instruction read:
That there should be more than a bare probability of the defendant's
innocence; that they should have a reasonable doubt of his guilt, growing out
of the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence; such a doubt as would induce a
reasonable man to say, I am not satisfied that the defendant is guilty.
Id. at 661. The trial court erroneously used the word "probability" instead of
"possibility." Id. The court found, however, that this error could not have affected the
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found this to be reversible error, stating that "[i]f there is a probability
of innocence, every reasonable man must doubt of guilt."'21
In 1866, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Miller v. People, 26 ap-
proved a more elaborate jury instruction defining reasonable doubt. 127
The court, citing Pate, approved the following jury instruction:
In considering the case the jury are not to go beyond the
evidence to hunt up doubts, nor must they entertain such doubts
as are merely chimerical or conjectural. A doubt to justify an
acquittal must be reasonable, and it must arise from a candid
and impartial investigation of all the evidence in the case, and
unless it is such that, were the same kind of doubt interposed in
the graver transactions of life, it would cause a reasonable and
prudent man to hesitate and pause, it is insufficient to authorize
a verdict of not guilty. If, after considering all the evidence, you
can say you have an abiding conviction of the truth of the
charge, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.
128
After the Miller decision, the Illinois Supreme Court began to cite an
abridged version of the Miller instruction to define a standard reason-
able doubt instruction. 29
Eventually, an apparent conflict arose over which version-the
Miller or the abridged-correctly defined reasonable doubt. For
example, in 1884 the Illinois Supreme Court cited Miller approvingly,
but applied the abridged version of the reasonable doubt jury instruc-
tion. 3 ° Three years later in the "Haymarket Riot" case,' 3' however,
jury's decision. Id. at 662.
125. Id. at 665 (Purple, J., and Wilson, C.J., dissenting).
126. 39 Ill. 457 (1866), overruled by State v. Cagle, 244 N.E.2d 200, 204 (Il1.
1969).
127. Id. at 463-64.
128. Id. The court reasoned:
It is a familiar doctrine of the law in criminal cases, that if a reasonable doubt
of the guilt of the prisoner is entertained, the jury have no discretion, but must
acquit. Where there is an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge resting
in the minds of the jury, there cannot be, at the same time, in the same mind, a
reasonable doubt.
Id. at 464 (citations omitted).
129. See, e.g., Connaghan v. People, 88 Ill. 460 (1878); May v. People, 60 II1. 119
(1871). In May, the court, citing Miller, stated that "[a] reasonable doubt is one arising
from a candid and impartial investigation of all the evidence, and such as, in the graver
transactions of life, would cause a reasonable and prudent man to hesitate and pause."
May, 60 I11. at 120. Subsequently, the Connaghan court cited the May instruction with
approval. Connaghan, 88 111. at 462.
130. Dunn v. People, 109 III. 635, 645 (1884). In Dunn, the court "condemned" the
following jury instruction:
That the guilt of the defendant must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as
used in the instructions in this case, means, not a possible doubt, not a
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the court once again approved the unabridged Miller instruction.
3 2
The Illinois Supreme Court alluded to this conflict between the
complete and shortened Miller instruction in Wacaser v. People'33 in
1890. There, the court appeared to approve of both instructions, but
characterized the longer version as being more "full and accurate."
'134
The court held, however, that as long as the defendant submits a cor-
rect jury instruction, he is entitled to have the jury so instructed.'35
This acceptance of both versions was illustrated when a defendant, in
conjectural doubt, not an imaginary doubt, not a doubt of the absolute
certainty of the guilt of the accused, because everything relating to human
affairs, and depending upon moral evidence, is open to conjectural or
imaginary doubt, and because absolute certainty is not required by law. A
reasonable doubt exists in that state of the case which, after considering and
comparing all the evidence in the case, leaves the minds of the jury in that
condition that they can not say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of
the charge; but where the evidence in this case establishes the truth of the
charge to a reasonable and moral certainty, that convinces the understanding
and satisfies the reason and judgment of the jury of the truth of the charge,
then, in law, there exists no reasonable doubt.
Id. at 644-45. The court opined that the instruction quoted did not define reasonable
doubt as a matter of law, but rather was "more in the nature of an argument." Id. at
645.
13 1. Spies v. People, 12 N.E. 865, 986 (I11. 1887), 17 N.E. 898 (I11. 1887) (Mulkey,
J., concurring) (concurring opinion filed by Judge Mulkey later than majority opinion
because of illness). Spies became known as the "Haymarket Riot" case. The Haymarket
Riot occurred in 1886 during a labor demonstration in Chicago's Haymarket Square.
Max Boot, Fighting Terrorism, Then and Now, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1995, at A14. See
also Jim Ritter, City Unions Won Clout-But Not Without a Fight, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Sept. 4, 1994, at 16. One reporter has commented on the facts of the occurrence:
On May 4, 1886, police moved to break up a workers meeting in Haymarket
Square on the Near West Side. Someone threw a bomb; police and workers
opened fire. Seven cops and two civilians were killed.
Although the bomb thrower was never positively identified, eight anarchists
were convicted. Four were hung and one committed suicide. Gov. John Peter
Altgeld pardoned the other three on the grounds that they didn't receive a fair
trial.
Ritter, supra.
132. Spies, 12 N.E. at 986.
133. 25 N.E. 564 (I11. 1890).
134. Id. at 565. The Wacaser decision involved a murder trial and a claim of self-
defense. Wacaser, 25 N.E. at 564. The trial court refused to give the jury instruction
submitted by the defendant, and instead read the following instruction to the jury:
If a man kills another, and the killing be proven, or admitted, and then sets up
self-defense as a defense to the indictment, the jury ought always [to] be
satisfied, from the evidence, that the killing was done under an honest belief,
on the part of the defendant, that it was necessary, to save himself from death,
or great bodily harm ....
Id. at 565.
135. Id.
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1893, challenged a Miller-type instruction in Painter v. People.3 6 The
Illinois Supreme Court, without offering a single citation, and without
reservation, approved of the instruction given by the trial court.'37
Gradually, however, the court's confidence in providing a definition
for reasonable doubt began to erode. In 1895, for example, the court
expressed one of its first doubts about the propriety of defining
"reasonable doubt." In Little v. People, 38 the court stated in dicta that
a Miller-type instruction would have been proper had a party asked for
such a definition. 39 While this statement paralleled a statement the
court made in Wacaser, the court in Little noted that attempts to define
reasonable doubt may actually do more to confuse jurors about the
meaning of the term.'40
Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court, in 1914, sustained the trial
court's refusal of a complicated definition of reasonable doubt and
noted that the meaning of the term is easily understood and needs no
definition.' 4' In several subsequent cases, the court stated that there
was no better definition of reasonable doubt than the words them-
selves. 42
Throughout the 1920s the Illinois Supreme Court became even more
critical of reasonable doubt instructions. The court increasingly found
136. 35 N.E. 64 (111. 1893).
137. Id. at 72. The court noted that "[i]nstructions in this precise language have been
so frequently given in criminal trials, and have been so many times approved by this
court, that we are somewhat at a loss to comprehend the criticism." Id.
138. 42 N.E. 389 (Ill. 1895).
139. Little, 42 N.E. at 391.
140. Id. The court noted:
It has been doubted by many eminent judges and text writers whether attempts
to explain the meaning of the term "reasonable doubt" do not lead to
confusion and misunderstanding in the minds of the jury, rather than to clear
comprehension; the term itself being easily and readily understood as any
definition of it.
Id. (citations omitted); see also People v. Barkas, 99 N.E. 698, 702-03 (Ill. 1912). In
the course of approving of what it characterized as a "stock instruction" on reasonable
doubt, the Barkas Court, without citation, stated:
[lI]t is very questionable whether any good purpose is ever served by giving
involved and labored definitions of the words "reasonable doubt" in stating
the law to juries in criminal cases. The term "reasonable doubt" has no other
or different meaning in law than it has when used in any of the ordinary
transactions or affairs of life. It is doubtful whether any better definition of
the term can be found than the words themselves.
Id. See also People v. Fox, 110 N.E. 26, 32 (II1. 1915) (quoting Barkas for this
proposition).
141. People v. Hansen, 104 N.E. 1069, 1072 (I11. 1914).
142. See, e.g., People v. Moses, 123 N.E. 634, 636 (I11. 1919) (citations omitted);
People v. Parker, 120 N.E. 14, 18 (I11. 1918).
1996] Instructing Illinois Juries on "Reasonable Doubt"
specific reasonable doubt instructions to be erroneous, 43 and the court
continued to criticize the entire concept of offering a jury instruction
defining reasonable doubt.' 44 In People v. Leggio,145 for example, the
court stated that an instruction on reasonable doubt was never needed,
and that the words, essentially, define themselves."
Despite this line of authority, the Illinois Supreme Court did not
speak with one voice on the issue. In several cases the court disap-
proved of instructions defining reasonable doubt. 47 In People v.
Schuele,48 for example, the court held that the term reasonable doubt
needs no definition, and that it was erroneous to provide any
definition.'49 In at least one other case, however, the court found no
error in giving reasonable doubt jury instructions. 50 In addition, in
People v. Provo 5' the court responded to the defendant's complaint
that all his instructions on reasonable doubt were refused and stated:
"[l]engthy instructions on reasonable doubt are not approved, but we
are of the opinion that properly worded instructions may call the jury's
attention to the rule that a defendant must be proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt."' 52 These cases make it questionable whether the
court was trying to forbid all reasonable doubt instructions or merely
trying to prohibit complicated instructions. '
53
143. See, e.g., People v. Haskins, 169 N.E. 18, 22 (I11. 1929) (finding an instruction
erroneous but not reversible error); People v. Cassler, 163 N.E. 430, 436 (i11. 1928)
(same); People v. Schuele, 157 N.E. 215, 217-18 (II1. 1927) (holding that reasonable
doubt needs no definition and that it is erroneous to give one); People v. Rogers, 154
N.E. 909, 913 (I1l. 1926) (same); cf. People v. Johnson, 148 N.E. 255, 257-58 (111.
1925) (finding an instruction defining reasonable doubt as it applies to specific
elements of the crime to be erroneous); People v. Prall, 145 N.E. 610, 613 (II1. 1924)
(finding an instruction defining reasonable doubt as it applies to specific elements of
the crime to be erroneous).
144. Cases discouraging the use of such instructions include People v. Schuele, 157
N.E. 215, 217-18 (Ill. 1927); People v. Rogers, 154 N.E. 909, 913 (111. 1926); People
v. Klein, 137 N.E. 145, 149-50 (Il. 1922).
145. 161 N.E. 60 (111. 1928).
146. Id. at 62 (quoting People v. Johnson, 148 N.E. 255, 258 (11. 1925)). The court
stated that "[i]t is difficult to find a plainer or more explicit definition of reasonable
doubt than the words themselves, and efforts to do so usually result merely in an
elaboration of language without any corresponding amplification of the idea." Id.
147. Schuele, 157 N.E. at 217-18; Rogers, 154 N.E. at 913; Johnson, 148 N.E. at
257-58.
148. 157 N.E. 215 (Ill. 1927).
149. Schuele, 157 N.E. at 217-18 (quoting Johnson, 148 N.E. at 255).
150. See People v. Hartwell, 173 N.E. 112, 113-14 (Ill. 1930) (discussing the need
for an instruction establishing the reasonable doubt standard for each element of the
crime).
151. 97 N.E.2d 802 (I1. 1951).
152. Provo, 97 N.E.2d at 807.
153. People v. Klein, 137 N.E. 145, 149-50 (Ill. 1922). But see Leggio, 161 N.E. at
943
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This vacillation between condemning all instructions attempting to
define reasonable doubt and then occasionally suggesting that such an
instruction may be proper continued during the following decades.'1
4
In cases such as People v. Malmenato.5 in the 1950s, People v.
Cagle56 in the 1960s, and People v. Edwards157 in the 1970s, the
court continued to suggest that instructions defining reasonable doubt
should never be used.15 8 Yet, just when the issue appeared to be
settled, in 1986 the Illinois Supreme Court decided People v.
Bryant.5 9 The Bryant court held that, in cases containing circum-
stantial evidence, the "reasonable theory of innocence" charge should
not be used.16 In the course of deciding this issue, the court stated:
62 (holding that no reasonable doubt instruction was ever needed and that the condemned
instruction was not long nor did it use language as objectionable as other instructions).
154. Compare People v. Maffioli, 94 N.E.2d 191, 195 (Ill. 1950) (holding that an
instruction on reasonable doubt should not have been given but did not result in
prejudicial error) and People v. Davis, 92 N.E.2d 649, 651-52 (111. 1950) (same) and
People v. Flynn, 38 N.E.2d 49, 51-52 (I11. 1941) (same) and People v. Baker, 6 N.E.2d
665, 670 (111. 1936) (same) and People v. Casey, 183 N.E. 616, 621 (111. 1932) (stating
that reasonable doubt needs no definition and may constitute prejudicial error) with
People v. Provo, 97 N.E.2d 802, 807 (I11. 1951) (holding that although lengthy
instructions on reasonable doubt are improper, properly worded instructions are
allowable) and People v. Shapiro, 20 N.E.2d 284, 286 (111. 1939) (explaining that
reasonable doubt instructions have been criticized but have not provided the basis for
reversal) and People v. Lee, 14 N.E.2d 498, 499 (111. 1938) (stating merely that
"reasonable doubt" need not be defined).
155. 150 N.E.2d 806 (111.), cert. denied, Malmenato v. Illinois, 358 U.S. 899
(1958).
156. 244 N.E.2d 200 (III. 1969).
157. 302 N.E.2d 306 (Ill. 1973), cert. denied, Edwards v. Illinois, 415 U.S. 928
(1974).
158. In Malmenato, while the court believed any definition of reasonable doubt was
futile, the court held that the instruction proffered by the prosecutor was not prejudicial.
Malmenato, 150 N.E.2d at 811. In Cagle, the court stated the following: "This court
has repeatedly held that the legal concept of 'reasonable doubt' needs no definition, and
that where an involved instruction on that concept is given it may be deemed prejudicial
error." Cagle, 244 N.E.2d at 204 (citations omitted). It is significant to note that the
Cagle court overruled that part of Miller v. People, 39 Ill. 457 (1866), "which gives
approbation of any . . . complicated instructions [defining reasonable doubt]." Id. In
Edwards, the court simply stated that it is "better practice not to attempt to define the
term 'reasonable doubt' either in voir dire or closing argument." Edwards, 302 N.E.2d at
311.
159. 499 N.E.2d 413 (III. 1986).
160. Id. at 419. The "reasonable theory of innocence" charge is defined in Illinois
Patiern Jury Instructions for criminal cases, section 3.02. ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY
INSTRucTIONS (CRIMINAL), No. 3.02 (1981). The instruction reads as follows:
Circumstantial evidence is the proof of facts or circumstances which give rise
to a reasonable inference of other facts which tend to show the guilt or
innocence of the defendant. Circumstantial evidence should be considered by
you together with all the other evidence in the case in arriving at your verdict.
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The question whether the ["reasonable theory of innocence"]
instruction should be retained is, we believe, distinct from the
question whether reasonable doubt must be defined. We do not
consider here whether an instruction defining reasonable doubt
is necessary; if one were required, we see no reason why the same
definitional instructions would not be used in all cases ....161
The Illinois bar noticed this suggestion that the court might consider
some type of reasonable doubt instruction to be proper. 162 Yet,
perhaps predictably, the court in 1992 again veered back to stating
"[tihe law in Illinois is clear that neither the court nor counsel should
attempt to define the reasonable doubt standard for the jury."'163
Undoubtedly, the decrease in the number of reasonable doubt in-
structions given in criminal cases can also be attributed to the influence
of the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions.' 64 Starting with the publi-
cation of the first edition of the Pattern Instructions in 1968, each of
the three editions have stated that an instruction is not recom-
mended. 165 In addition, since Bryant held that courts may no longer
You should not find the defendant guilty unless the facts or circumstances
proved exclude every reasonable theory of innocence.
Id. The court held that this instruction should no longer be used, reasoning that the
"reasonable theory of innocence" charge essentially attempts to define reasonable
doubt. Bryant, 499 N.E.2d at 419.
161. Bryant, 499 N.E.2d at 419-20 (emphasis added).
162. See, e.g., People v. Barnett, 527 N.E.2d 1071, 1078 (111. App. 2d Dist. 1988).
The defendant, relying on Bryant, argued that the issue of whether the court may find a
definition of reasonable doubt to be proper remained an open question. Barnett, 527
N.E.2d at 1078. The court, however, did not agree with the defendant's argument. Id.
163. People v. Speight, 606 N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (I11. 1992) (citations omitted). It is
important to note, however, that while the prosecutor attempted to define reasonable
doubt by stating the doubt "has to be substantial," the court held that this error was not
prejudicial to the defendant. Id. at 1177 (emphasis omitted).
164. See People v. Failor, 649 N.E.2d 1342, 1343 (I11. App. 4th Dist. 1995) (stating
that the Illinois Supreme Court's clear mandate against reasonable doubt instructions is
found in the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions); People v. Barnett, 527 N.E.2d 1071,
1078 (I11. App. 2d Dist 1988) (stating that Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction No. 2.05
recommends that no jury instruction on reasonable doubt be given); In re Estate of
Casey, 507 N.E.2d 962, 966-67 (I11. App. 4th Dist 1987) (noting that Illinois Pattern
Jury Instruction No. 2.05 states that the term reasonable doubt is best left undefined);
People v. Phillips, 263 N.E.2d 353, 356 (111. App. 3d Dist. 1970) (holding that due to
Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction No. 2.05, it is the rule that a definition of reasonable
doubt should not be given).
165. ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL), No. 2.05 (1968); ILLINOIS
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL), No. 2.05 (2d ed. 1981); ILLINOIS PATrERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL), No. 2.05 (3d ed. 1992). See supra note 21 for the text of the
instruction. The only difference between the three versions is that the Second and Third
Editions titled these comments "Committee Note."
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use the "reasonable theory of innocence" charge, another attempt at
clarification of reasonable doubt has been foreclosed.166
B. Defining Reasonable Doubt: The Illinois Myth
and the Illinois Reality
One could argue that the "black-letter law" of Illinois, as reflected in
the Illinois Supreme Court's 1992 opinion in People v. Speight 67 and
the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, 168 confirms that it is improper to
define the term "reasonable doubt."'169 As the Illinois Supreme Court
has said, "[i]t is doubtful whether any better definition of the term can
be found than the words themselves."' 70 The rule is neat and simple; it
is also a myth. If the phrase "reasonable doubt" were truly self-
defining, Illinois courts would not be faced with the endless
procession of cases in which both attorneys and judges offer defini-
tions of these two words.'
7
'
Even more troubling is the fact that Illinois courts do not consis-
tently follow their own rule. Illinois courts hold that defense lawyers
may not attempt to define reasonable doubt. 72 Yet Illinois courts have
actually approved attempts by the prosecution to define reasonable
doubt. For example, in 1983 the Illinois Supreme Court in People v.
Bryant'73 approved of a prosecutor's closing argument that charac-
terized the state's burden as being one which is "not unreasonable" and
"met each and every day in the courts."'' 74 In addition, the Bryant
166. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. See also People v. Pintos, 549
N.E.2d 344, 347-48 (111. 1989) (Miller, J., specially concurring) (recognizing that
Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 3.02 may no longer be used); People v. Cole, 550
N.E.2d 723, 728 (Il1. App. 4th Dist. 1990) (Steigmann, J., concurring) (same).
167. 606 N.E.2d 1174 (I11. 1992).
168. See supra note 21 for some of the reasons, outlined in the Illinois Pattern Jury
Instructions, for not providing a definition of the term "reasonable doubt."
169. Speight, 606 N.E.2d at 1177 ("'The law in Illinois is clear that neither the court
nor counsel should attempt to define the reasonable doubt standard for the jury."); see
also supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (discussing Illinois courts' refusal to
define reasonable doubt).
170. People v. Barkas, 99 N.E. 698, 703 (I11. 1912); see also supra notes 52-60 and
accompanying text for a discussion of whether a constitutionally deficient reasonable
doubt instruction could ever be merely harmless error.
171. See supra notes 173-80 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., People v. Wendt, 539 N.E.2d 768, 775 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1989)
(holding that instruction requested not allowed); People v. Barnett, 527 N.E.2d 1071,
1078 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1988) (finding request for defendant's definition of reasonable
doubt properly denied); People v. Garcia, 431 N.E.2d 1234, 1239 (Ill. App. 1st Dist.
1981) (holding that trial judge properly denied defense counsel's attempt to define
reasonable doubt in his closing argument).
173. 447 N.E.2d 301 (I11. 1983).
174. Id. at 306.
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court did not characterize the prosecutor's attempt to define
"reasonable doubt" as harmless error; rather, it was found to be proper
argument.175 As a consequence, lower courts have relied on Bryant to
approve prosecutorial comments concerning reasonable doubt.' 76
The Illinois Supreme Court has since approved other prosecutorial
arguments defining reasonable doubt. 177 Two years after the Bryant
decision, the court found the following comments proper in People v.
Collins: 178
The state's burden is the same burden of proof in every case
that is tried in this courtroom, every case that is tried in this
county, and every case that is tried in this country. It is beyond
a reasonable doubt. The penitentiary is full of people like
Collins and Bracey who have been proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. IT9
Then, four years later, the Illinois Supreme Court expressly relied on
Collins to approve the following statement by the prosecutor:
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., People v. Lybarger, 555 N.E.2d 1264, 1266 (II1. App. 3d Dist. 1990)
(relying on People v. Wade, 522 N.E.2d 285, 287-88 (Ill. App. 3d Dist. 1988), and
approving prosecutor's comment that "[b]eyond a reasonable doubt does not mean
beyond all doubt, shadow of a doubt, or a doubt created by the imagination of counsel");
People v. Williams, 542 N.E.2d 93, 98-99 (111. App. 1st Dist. 1989) (relying on Bryant
and approving prosecutor's comment that reasonable doubt is "[c]ertainly not an
impossible burden"); People v. Woods, 527 N.E.2d 485, 488 (III. App. 1st Dist. 1988)
(relying on Bryant and approving prosecutor's comment that it is proper to say that
beyond a reasonable doubt is met "every day, all year, all the time"); People v. Thomas,
526 N.E.2d 467, 473 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1988) (relying on Bryant and approving of
prosecutor telling jury that "there is nothing magical about the State's burden of proof
and that such standard is applied daily in all criminal cases"); People v. Wade, 522
N.E.2d 285, 287-88 (I11. App. 3d Dist. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 546 N.E.2d 553
(Ill. 1989) (relying on Bryant and approving of prosecutor's "comment[ing] on the
burden of proof if the prosecutor's comments do not distort that burden"); People v.
Hughes, 521 N.E.2d 240, 242 (Ill. App. 3d Dist. 1988) (quoting Bryant); People v.
Hicks, 516 N.E.2d 807, 812 (I11. App. 2d Dist. 1987) (relying on Bryant and approving
prosecutor's comment that "[t]here is no magic involved. It's up to you to decide what
reasonable doubt is"); People v. Seals, 505 N.E.2d 1107, 1113 (II1. App. Ist Dist.
1987) (relying on Bryant and approving of "prosecutor's characterization of burden of
proof as not overwhelming and the same in every jurisdiction"); People v. Calhoun, 494
N.E.2d 498, 501-02 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1986) (relying on Bryant and approving of a
prosecutor telling a jury that "reasonable doubt happens ever[y] single day in this
County. It is proved in every single case, hundreds of times a week, thousands of times a
month."); People v. Trass, 483 N.E.2d 567, 576-77 (II1. App. 1st Dist. 1985) (relying
on Bryant and approving a prosecutor's comment that "[t]he defense would have you
believe that it is an insurmountable burden, some mystical thing" and that "[i]t is a
burden that is met by juries all over the country").
177. See infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
178. 478 N.E.2d 267 (Il1. 1985).
179. Id. at 284.
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[The standard of reasonable doubt is the] same standard that's
been used in this court room, in all the court rooms in this
country, throughout the county, throughout the state,
throughout the country, through our entire history. It's nothing
new. There is nothing different about that standard of proof.
That standard of proof does not require perfection.'
8 0
As these cases indicate, the "rule" that counsel may not define
"reasonable doubt" is a myth. The supreme court held these examples
to constitute proper argument, not harmless error. Thus, offering defi-
nitions of the meaning of "beyond a reasonable doubt" is a one-way
street: it is improper for the judge to offer an instruction; it is improper
for the defense to define it; but Illinois courts have often approved of a
prosecutor's "definition" delivered in the course of closing argu-
ment. ''
V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT "REASONABLE DOUBT"
Is NOT A SELF-DEFINING CONCEPT AND THAT JURIES
NEED INSTRUCTION
The previous Part showed that the widely-held belief that Illinois
juries are not instructed on the definition of "reasonable doubt" is
actually a myth.'82 It is true that the judge may not formally instruct
180. People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357, 373 (111. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1018
(1990); See also People v. Batson, 587 N.E.2d 549, 556 (I11. App. 1st Dist. 1992)
(following Harris).
181. See 2 F. LEE BAILEY AND KENNETH J. FISHMAN, CRIMINAL TRIAL TECHNIQUES, §
48:6 (1994) (stressing that an attorney "should make the jury aware of the rule of
reasonable doubt at all times"). Illinois courts refuse to permit defense counsel, during
closing argument, to offer his or her own comments on the meaning of reasonable
doubt. See People v. Boyd, 410 N.E.2d 931, 955 (111. App. 1st Dist. 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1080 (1981) (restricting defense counsel from saying: "This is reasonable
doubt number one, this is reasonable doubt number two."); People v. Malone, 261
N.E.2d 776, 778 (I11. App. 1st Dist. 1970) (holding that reasonable doubt needs no
elaboration). On the other hand, Illinois courts allow the prosecution to comment on
the meaning of reasonable doubt during closing argument. See, e.g., People v. Gacho,
522 N.E.2d 1146, 1162 (I11.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 910 (1988) (allowing the
prosecution to state as follows in closing argument: "Reasonable Doubt. There's
nothing magical about proving somebody guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."); People
v. Collins, 478 N.E.2d 267, 285 (I11.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935 (1985) (allowing
prosecution to state in the closing argument that the burden of proof "is the same burden
of proof in every case that is tried in this courtroom, every case that is tried in this
county, and every case that is tried in this country"); People v. Bryant, 447 N.E.2d 301,
306-07 (I11. 1983) (holding that the "prosecutor's characterization of the State's burden
as one which is 'not unreasonable' and 'met each and every day in the courts' reduced that
burden"); People v. Lybarger, 555 N.E.2d 1264, 1266 (I11. App. 3d Dist. 1990) (holding
that "a prosecutor must not be severely limited in his closing and it is therefore proper
for a prosecutor to comment on the burden if his comments do not distort that burden").
182. See supra notes 167-81 and accompanying text.
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the jury on this point. 83 It is also true that the defense is forbidden to
offer a definition during closing argument, although in practice the
degree the defense will be able to address this in closing argument will
perhaps depend on the discretion of the individual trial judge.'8 4
However, as shown above, appellate opinions often approve the pro-
conviction definitions offered by prosecutors during closing argu-
ment.'"8
One might expect Illinois defense counsel to be outraged by this in-
equity. One might expect them to shower trial courts with alternative
definitions of "reasonable doubt," rather than ceding that area to the
prosecution. It is surprising, therefore, that case reports and the litera-
ture show no such ferment. One reason might be that some defense
counsel are content to have no definition of "reasonable doubt" given
to the jury. 186 There may exist a feeling that an undefined "reasonable
doubt" is the "wild card," the "ace in the hole" in the defense case;
there may be a feeling that the defense has an advantage by leaving the
definition of "reasonable doubt" to the imagination of the jury.'87
Every defense attorney seems to have at least one anecdote where (she
183. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 173-81 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 173-81 and accompanying text. In addition, one commentator
has noted how appellate courts treat "reasonable doubt":
[lI]t is interesting to compare how differently federal appellate courts review
"reasonable doubt" rulings when the context shifts from whether evidence is
sufficient to support a conviction to whether a constitutional error is
harmless. Appellate courts rarely reverse a trial court's ruling that the
evidence is sufficient to permit a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, when trial courts apply the harmless error doctrine to constitutional
violations and rule that the prosecution has not sustained its burden of
showing that a constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
they are frequently reversed.
If appellate courts were taking seriously the legal standard of proof that
persuades beyond a reasonable doubt, we should expect to see at lease a modest
number of cases in which a reviewing court says, "the evidence perhaps
suffices to persuade a reasonable trier by the 'preponderance' standard but it
does not suffice to persuade beyond a reasonable doubt." It is astonishing how
rarely we see a federal appellate court using anything like that language.
Newman, supra note 2, at 989-90.
186. Walter W. Steele, Jr. and Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A
Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 98-99 (1988) ("Many lawyers
and judges simply do not believe that juror confusion is a serious problem. Since they
understand the instructions, they believe that jurors understand them as well.").
187. Note, Reasonable Doubt: An Argument Against Definition, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1955, 1970 (1995) ("Responsibility for determining the precise meaning of [reasonable
doubt] is better located within the criminal jury because jurors, as community
representatives, have the collective capacity legitimately to make the value judgment
required to interpret the reasonable doubt standard and impose the criminal sanction.")
(citation omitted).
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believes) the undefined, amorphous concept of "reasonable doubt"
resulted in a jury acquittal. Some criminal defense attorneys appear to
believe that a jury instruction defining "reasonable doubt" would
somehow sap the term of its talismanic power.'
The supposed magic of an undefined "reasonable doubt" is yet
another myth. Reid Hastie of the University of Colorado has pro-
duced empirical evidence indicating that the term "'easonable doubt"--
undefined and standing by itself-has far less power over juries than
criminal defense lawyers often believe.'8 9
First, consider the defense lawyer's paradigm criminal trial. This
paradigm states that a defendant is clothed with a "presumption of
innocence" and that he can be convicted only if the prosecution proves
him guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt."' 90 Thus, on a continuum of
"0 to 100," the prosecution begins its case at point "0." Under the
civil standard of "preponderance of the evidence," for example, the
plaintiff would have to get to "51" to sustain his burden. 9 ' But in a
criminal case, according to the defense, the prosecution has to intro-
duce sufficient evidence to get to a rather high point (98? 99? 100?) on
the continuum before we can say the defendant is guilty "beyond a
reasonable doubt."'' 92
Empirical studies indicate that this idealized view contains more fic-
tion than fact. Consider the concept of "presumption of innocence."
Professor Hastie has reviewed the literature on this issue and has
188. As one commentator has argued, "[T]he phrase, standing alone, invites
deliberation. It focuses juror attention on a concept rather than on words; it requiresjurors to struggle with the meaning of the concept and to incorporate their thoughts and
community values into the standard they apply." Newman, supra note 2, at 1970-71
(citation omitted).
189. Reid Hastie, Algebraic Models of Juror Decision Processes, in INSIDE THE JUROR
84, 100-08 (Reid Hastie, ed., 1993). In his article, Professor Hastie explains the
algebraic method:
The basic image of the decision maker according to the algebraic modeling
approach is a "judgmental accountant" who converts all information relevant
to a judgment into numbers representing the implications of each piece of
evidence and the importance that should be accorded to each of them and then
calculates a weighted sum to provide a "bottom line" evaluation.
Id. at 84.
190. See id. at 99.
191. Id. at 106. Professor Hastie notes that studies indicate a range for the
preponderance of the evidence standard from .48 to .82. Id.
192. See id. at 101. When determining the numerical equivalent of "reasonable
doubt," Professor Hastie notes that "[dlifferent studies and different methods elicited a
variety of average ratings from the subjects; for example, estimates of the beyond-
reasonable-doubt standard in criminal cases ranged from .51 to .92." Id.
950 [Vol. 27
1996] Instructing Illinois Juries on "Reasonable Doubt" 951
found that the majority of studies concluded that people do not begin
considering a hypothetical guilt-innocence option at Point "0":193
Most of the empirical studies provide evidence for subjects'
initial inclination to distribute uncertainty approximately in a
50-50 manner between guilt-innocent options, at least as
expressed in marks near the midpoint of a judgment rating scale
or by assigning guilt-innocent initial odds in a 1:1 ratio at the
beginning of the decision process. 94
In other words, people begin at "Point 50" instead of "Point 0."
Hastie found this to be true even though two of the studies explicitly
provided the participants with an instruction defining "presumption of
innocence."' 15 Thus, the reality is not that the prosecution starts at
"Point 0"; in fact, in the minds of jurors, the prosecution begins at a
point over half-way to proof "beyond a reasonable doubt."'9
What, then, constitutes proof "beyond a reasonable doubt?" Over
the last twenty-five years,.social scientists have used two types of sur-
veys to discover people's perceptions. The first type is known as the
"direct rating method."'' 97 Here a subject is provided with some
version of a "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction. 98 She is then
asked what likelihood or probability that a defendant committed an act
she would require before finding that defendant guilty.' 99 The subject
is asked to express this on a "0 to 10" scale, with 10 being the highest
degree of proof.2" Hastie collected these surveys, conducted by vari-
193. Id. at 98.
194. Id. (citations omitted).
195. Id. (citing Vicki S. Helgeson & Kelly G. Shaver, Presumption of Innocence:
Congruence Bias Induced and Overcome, 20 JOURNAL OF APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
276 (1990) and Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, On the Requirements of
Proof. The Timing of Judicial Instruction and Mock Juror Verdicts, 37 JOURNAL OF
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1877 (1979)).
196. Hastie, supra note 189, at 106. Professor Hastie states that:
[IT]he typical finding that the presumption of innocence is manifested in an
even-handed 50-50 initial attitude toward guilt suggests an intriguing
speculation. Perhaps the "quantity" of evidence required to convict a defendant
of most criminal charges is less than expert and juror intuitions .. . imply.
Rather than requiring "enough" evidence to move a juror from disbelief (close
to 0%) to near certainty (over 90%), perhaps the typical "winning"
prosecution case moves a juror from equivocal (50) to a strong, but not
overwhelming, preponderance (about 65%).
Id. Professor Hastie suggests, however, that this conclusion must be regarded as
speculative, as most studies have not used complex trial situations. Id.
197. Id. at 101-06.
198. Id. at 101-02.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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ous researchers over several decades, and found responses in the 8 to
9 range to be common.20 '
This method, however, has attracted scholarly criticism. Stuart
Nagel of the University of Illinois faulted this method on two
grounds.0 2 First, it is not obvious that two subjects who say they
require a probability of 8 out of 10 are saying the same thing; two
people may have very different ideas of what a .8 probability
means.2 3 There is a second reason as well:
Respondents tend to give answers which they consider socially
proper, rather than responses that reflect their true values. Thus,
respondents who are aware that the law expects a high guilt
probability before a conviction will report that they personally
require a high probability before they will vote to convict. That
is not true of respondents who think the law expects a lower
probability.204
In order to control for this phenomenon, a new method was developed
known as the "indirect method." 205 The subject of the survey is told
that a juror can make four possible decisions: (a) he can convict a
defendant who is truly guilty; (b) he can convict a defendant who is
actually innocent; (c) he can acquit a defendant who is actually guilty;
or (d) he can acquit a defendant who is truly innocent.2°6 Of these four
choices, the subject is then asked which ones are undesirable. The
subject usually chooses choices (b) and (c). 207 When asked which is
the more undesirable of the two, the subject usually chooses (b)---con-
victing an innocent man.2 08 The subject is then told to imagine that this
option is placed at Point 100 on a continuum marking degrees of
undesirability from 0 to 100.2t9 He is then asked where on this con-
tinuum he would place the other undesirable option-acquitting a
guilty man.21" As an example, let us assume the subject agrees with
Blackstone that it is better that ten guilty men go free than to convict
one innocent man.211 Thus, that person would believe that convicting
201. Id.
202. Stuart Nagel, Bringing the Values of Jurors in Line With the Law, 63
JUDICATURE 189, 191 (1979).
203. Id. at 191.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 191-92.
206. Id. at 191.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Hastie, supra note 189, at 102 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
358).
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an innocent man is ten times worse than acquitting a guilty man.
Therefore, he would position "acquitting a guilty man" merely at Point
10, as opposed to "convicting an innocent man" at Point 100.12
Armed with this information, one can calculate a potential juror's
"threshold probability for convicting." 213 The formula is 100/(100 +
X), with "X" representing the value placed on the less undesirable
option." 4 In our Blackstone hypothetical "X" equals "10.,,215 Thus,
100/(100 + 10) is equal to 100/110.26 This equals .91.217 In other
words, a juror who agrees with Blackstone would need a probability
of guilt greater than .91 before he could convict.28
Hastie shows that studies utilizing this "indirect method" reflect a
much lower "threshold probability for convicting" than the "direct
method., 2'9 As Hastie's table indicates, the indirect method generally
produces a "threshold probability for convicting" in the mid-50s, as
opposed to the 80s usually found with the direct method. 220 As noted
above, a threshold probability of .91 means that a subject found the
possibility of convicting an innocent man to be ten times worse than
the possibility of acquitting a guilty man; that is, if convicting an inno-
cent man is Point 100, then acquitting a guilty man is only Point 10.221
Conversely, a potential juror with a "threshold probability for convict-
ing" of .55-which is roughly the average in the studies cited by
Hastie-would place "acquitting a guilty man" at approximately Point
82, while "convicting an innocent man" is at Point 100.222 Thus, this
latter potential juror sees "acquitting a guilty man" as being almost as
bad as "convicting an innocent man." In other words, while Black-
stone would let ten guilty men go free before convicting one innocent
man, the average potential juror would not even let two guilty men free
in this situation.
The "indirect method" thus indicates that, with a "threshold proba-
bility for convicting" of roughly .55, the average juror may indeed see
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt" as being not much more than a
212. Nagel, supra note 202, at 191-93.
213. Id. at 191.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 191-92.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 192.
219. Hastie, supra note 189, at 106.
220. Id. at 102, 105.
221. See supra, notes 205-12 and accompanying text.
222. See Hastie, supra note 189, at 106.
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criminal lawyer would call merely "preponderance of the evidence. 223
Hastie summarizes the studies in this area by stating that "[riather than
requiring 'enough' evidence to move a juror from disbelief (close to
0%) to near certainty (over 90%), perhaps the typical 'winning' prose-
cution case moves a juror from equivocal (50%) to a strong, but not
overwhelming, preponderance (about 65%).y224
The criminal defense lawyer may wish to re-think her belief that the
undefined phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt" means the same to her
as it does to the jurors in her case. Faced with a growing body of
empirical evidence, it would appear at best risky, and at worst foolish,
to entrust the definition of "beyond a reasonable doubt" to the gut re-
actions of lay people. The empirical record shows why Illinois finds
itself in the company of a dwindling number of jurisdictions that refuse
to define reasonable doubt for the jury.
VI. ILLINOIS NEEDS TO ADOPT AN INSTRUCTION WHICH DEFINES
THE CONCEPT OF "BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT"
As shown above, the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt" is hardly
a self-defining term.225 It cannot be properly understood without a
jury instruction. It is time for the Illinois criminal justice system to
accept the challenge of formulating such an instruction.
Although the literature is not unanimous on the utility of a reason-
able doubt instruction, 226 a study conducted by Stuart Nage 227 is very
revealing. Nagel worked with a group of men and women simulating
work as jurors on a rape case.228 He divided these mock jurors into
four groups: (1) a group which received no instruction on the meaning
223. Id.
224. Id. at 106-07.
225. Indeed, one commentator has noted:
Probably the clearest illustration of how American courts obfuscate the law,
for better or for worse, is in how they define the phrase "beyond a reasonable
doubt." It is thought to be one of those terms of art. In a recent trial, jurors
went home, looked the term up in a dictionary, and discussed its definition
during deliberations the next day. For that, the jury's verdict was reversed by
an appeals court.
SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 153 (1988).
226. Hastie, supra note 189, at 107-08. Research has shown that verbal instructions
on the preponderance and reasonable doubt instruction have "surprisingly small effects
on the decision criterion." Id. at 108. However, "instructions that refer to a numerical
standard (e.g., an instruction to convict only if the probability of guilt is greater than
.90) have substantial effects." Id.
227. Nagel, supra note 202, at 191.
228. Id. at 190 n.2.
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of "beyond a reasonable doubt;" (2) a group which received a purely
verbal instruction which simply used the words "beyond a reasonable
doubt;" (3) a group which received an instruction that talked in terms
of a .90 probability as the level of guilt required; and (4) a group
which received a Blackstone-like instruction stressing that convicting
an innocent person is ten times worse than acquitting a guilty
person.229 Nagel's results showed that the more stringent the instruc-
tion was, the higher the "threshold probability for guilt" was for each
group.230 Thus, the level of the instruction had a directly proportionate
effect on how much evidence each juror required before returning a
verdict of guilty.23'
A wide selection of possible "reasonable doubt" definitions is avail-
able.232 Justice Ginsburg, in her concurring opinion in Victor v.
Nebraska,233 cited a reasonable doubt instruction from the Federal
Judicial Center which she characterized as "clear, straightforward, and
accurate. ' '234 That instruction reads:
[T]he government has the burden of proving the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have
served as jurors in civil cases, where you were told that it is only
necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not true.
In criminal cases, the government's proof must be more
powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you
firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few
things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in
criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes
every possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of the
evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty
of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If on the other
hand, you think there is a real possibility that he is not guilty,
you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not
guilty.
235
This same instruction was also recently endorsed by Judge Jon 0.
Newman, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. 2
36
229. Id. at 194-95.
230. Id. at 195.
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 38, at 1726 nn. 86-88.
233. 114 S. Ct. 1252 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
234. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1253 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
235. Id. (citing FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 17-
18 (1987) (Instruction 21)).
236. Newman, supra note 2, at 991 n.55.
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Such an instruction need not be mandatory in every criminal case.
Illinois might choose to join those jurisdictions that leave the final
choice of whether to define with the defense.237 Illinois should, how-
ever, at least allow each criminal defendant the option of having the
jury instructed on this all-important, frequently misunderstood con-
cept.
VII. CONCLUSION
No reasonable doubt instruction is perfect, but that does not mean
that no attempt should be made to define it. Empirical evidence estab-
lishes that the failure to define reasonable doubt hurts only the defend-
ant.238 In a nation where most citizens are more afraid of being victims
of a crime rather than being unjustly accused of one,239 "proof beyond
a reasonable doubt" does not possess the magical power many defense
lawyers would like it to have.
There will never be a ground swell in Illinois to create a jury instruc-
tion defining reasonable doubt. Most trial judges are probably content
with the current system of refusing to define it. They know they are
safe from appellate scrutiny when, like the trial judge in the Williams24
case described in the Introduction,24' they simply refuse to respond to
a deliberating jury's request for a definition of the term.242 Prosecutors
are also happy. The appellate courts in Illinois have found many pro-
conviction, anti-defendant definitions of reasonable doubt used in
prosecutors' closing arguments to be either proper or, at worst,
harmless error.243
The change will have to come from the defense bar in Illinois. Even
though Illinois is one of the relatively few American jurisdictions
which do not define reasonable doubt, the complacency surrounding
this issue harms only one person in the courtroom-the defendant.
The apparent willingness of the Illinois defense bar to rely on anec-
dotal, rather than empirical, evidence on this issue is disturbing. Reid
Hastie has noted this general tendency among lawyers and law
professors and has remarked: "It seems parochial to reject the findings
from a sophisticated tradition of empirical analysis, to rely exclusively
237. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text for a list of jurisdictions that
allow the defense the option of having the jury instructed on reasonable doubt.
238. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
239. See Nagel, supra note 202, at 192.
240. People v. Williams, 625 N.E.2d 144 (I11. App. 1st Dist. 1994).
241. See supra notes 3-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of Williams.
242. Williams, 625 N.E.2d at 151.
243. See supra notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
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on . . . intuitions . . . to reach conclusions about how jurors . . .
perform."'2" Change will come only when the Illinois defense bar
begins to formulate reasonable doubt instructions and to ask trial
courts to use them. The time to start is now.
244. Hastie, supra note 189, at 97.
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